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Effect of
Changes in Legislation
Incorporated by Reference
The traditional objections raised by opponents to
incorporation by reference have been based on unlaw-
ful delegation of legislative powers and due process
limitations. Professor Hayes analyzes these objections
in the light of the recent Supreme Court decision,
United State v. Sharpnack, and suggests that re-
examination of the underlying principtes of such in-
corporation is needed.
Edward R. Hayes*
It is a cardinal principle of our fundamental law, in-
herent in our constitutional separation of the govern-
ment into three departments and the assignment of
the law making function exclusively to the legislative
department, that the legislature cannot abdicate its
power to make laws, or delegate this power to any
other department or body.'
ONE method by which a legislature may simplify its task of
enacting laws is to make use of the provisions of an existing statute
where appropriate to the problem before it. This may be accom-
plished by copying these provisions in full, or more simply by in-
corporating them in the new law by reference. Whether any
incorporation by reference should be permitted has sometimes been
doubted.2 It may be an unwise method of legislating, but where the
reference is only to existing law, courts have had little difficulty
upholding the referring legislation. A more difficult problem is
presented when the reference is not only to existing law but also to
* Professor of Law, Drake University Law SchooL
1. Annot., 79 L.Ed. 474, 476 (1935).
2. See DIcK=:soN, LEGISLATVE DRAFMG § 8.2 (1954); FaRu'N, Lzcmi.A'Esn REcu-
LATIOn § 16 (1932); WA.xnE, THE LEcL~sxawTrs PyoCESS 343 (1948); Poldervaart,
Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 Iowa L. REv. 705, 707-08 (1953).
3. Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference -A Statutory Jungle, 38 IowA L. REv.
705 (1953).
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that law as it may thereafter be modified; the problem is intensified
when that law is a statute of another jurisdiction.
To some writers and judges there is no doubt that a legislature is
powerless to enact a statute providing for incorporation by reference
of prospective laws. 4 They believe this position is implicit in federal
and state constitutions and supported by policy, precedent and prin-
ciple. But the recent decision of United States v. Sharpnack I sus-
tained one congressional incorporation by reference of state laws, as
subsequently modified, against a challenge that such incorporation
violated the federal constitution. This decision may well affect con-
sideration given by federal and state courts to other federal and state
referential legislation.
In recent years there has been considerable agitation for revision
of state income tax laws, involving incorporation by reference of the
federal internal revenue code as it may be amended from time to
time.' This is one reason why it seems appropriate to analyze Sharp-
nack and consider its implications, to discuss the reasons advanced
for incorporating an existing law as it may thereafter be modified,
and to examine the arguments raised in support of and in opposition
to such incorporations.
I. United States v. Sharpnack-BACKCnOuND; DECISION
Gerald Sharpnack was indicted in a United States district court,
charged with having committed certain offenses in 1955 at Randolph
Air Force Base, a federal enclave in Texas. The charge was laid under
the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act,7 which since 1948 has made acts
committed in such an enclave, and not punishable by any other con-
gressional enactment, a federal offense if punishable by a law of the
state in which the enclave is situated which was effective at the time
the act occurred. There was no other federal law applicable to the
charged offenses; but they were violations of a Texas law enacted in
1950.8 On defendant's motion the district court dismissed the indict-
ment "for the reason that Congress may not legislatively assimiiate
and adopt criminal statutes of a state which are enacted by the state
4. See, e.g., United States v. Barnaby, 51 Fed. 20 (C.C.D. Mont. 1892); HaU v. State,
20 Ohio 8 (1851); Blair v. Morgan, 59 S.C. 52, 87 S.E. 45 (1900); State ex rel. Kirsch-
ner v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 181, 310 P.2d 261 (1957); WALKER, THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS 344 (1948), Comment, 33 MICH. L. REV. 597 (1935), NOTE 8 U. CINC. L.
REV. 310, 313 (1984). One writer dismissed certain contra cases on the ground they
"'give no clear reasons for so holding." Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?,
25 MINN. L. REv. 261, 283 n.93 (1941). See also McCartin, The Constitutionality of
the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 17 FED. B.J. 157 (1957); Note, 70 HAuv. L.
REV. 685, 688 (1957).
5. 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
6. Kamins, Federally-Based State Income Taxes, 9 NAT'L TAx J. 46 (1956); Note,
17 MONT. L. REV. 203 (1956).
7. 62 Stat. 683 (1948); 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
8. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 535b, 535c (1952).
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subsequent to the enactment of the Federal Assimilative Statute." 9
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment of the district court
was reversed, and the indictment upheld.
There has been an Assimilative Crimes Act since 1825, but not until
1948 was there clear reference to prospective state legislation. Exami-
nation of the history of this legislation is useful both for background
to an analysis of the Sharpnack decision, and for understanding the
reasons behind a legislature's decision to incorporate not only exist-
ing but also prospective legislation by reference.
Only a small part of this country was under exclusive federal juris-
diction in the early days of the Republic. But the commission in such
areas of acts which were crimes at common law or under the statutes
of adjacent states became a problem of much concern. Some federal
crimes were defined in 1790,10 but the legislation did not cover many
criminal offenses, especially those recognized under common law.
Once it was determined that there was no federal common law of
crimes applicable to offenses committed in federal enclaves, 1 the
need for further legislation became apparent 12 Although this could
have been accomplished by detailed legislation, the congressional
committee to which the problem was referred apparently concluded
that it should not undertake the task of developing a complete crimi-
nal code applicable to the limited areas of federal enclaves and the
few people that would be affected.13 Instead legislation was proposed
and enacted1 4 to adopt for each enclave the offenses (not otherwise
9. United States v. Sharpnack (W.D. Texas 1957) (unreported, the quoted language
appears in 355 U.S. at 287; the district court also called the act "a delegation of Con-
gress' legislative authority to the States in violation of the Constitution of the United
States." 355. U.S. at 287 n.2.)
10. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 924, 1 Stat. 112.
11. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), discussed
in PasmNS, Cmnmn Ax. LAw 24 n.6 (1957). At about the same time it was held that,
once the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction over an enclave, the criminal
laws of the state in which it was situated would not be in force and the state courts
were without jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811). For a recent
related case, see Matter of Denetclaw, 83 Ariz. 299, 320 P.2d 697 (1958), involving
jurisdiction of the state to try an Indian for a traffic offense committed on a stretch of
U.S. Highway 66 located across an Indian reservation.
12. 1 STORY, Lu- OF STORY 244,293,297 (1851); 40 ANNALS OF Coxo. 929 (1823).
13. Representative Daniel Webster said that the committee proposing the assimila-
tive crime act, which had been asked to inquire into the problems of crimes on federal
enclaves "did not suppose it incumbent on them to enter into the details of a complete
code of penal laws for a few hundred of the people in the United States' dock yards and
arsenals." 1 GALEs & SATON, RGISTER or DEBATES IN CocGass 338 (1825.
14. The original act provided that if offenses were committed in federal enclaves,
for which punishment was not specifically provided by federal law, the offender "shall
...be liable to, and receive the same punishment as the laws of the state in which
[the enclave] ... is situated, provide for the like offence when committed within the
body of any county of such state." Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 3, STAT. 115. Some
subsequent reenactments expressly limited assimilation to state laws "now in force"
or as the "laws of the State ...now provide." Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 289,
35 Stat. 1145; Act of July 7, 1898, ch. 576, § 2, 30 Stat. 717; Act of April 5, 1866, ch.
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punishable under federal law) which were punishable by the state
in which the enclave was situated.
As the initial Assimilative Crimes Act did not specifically include
or exclude changes in state laws occurring after its enactment, its ef-
fect was not entirely clear. When a factual situation substantially like
that presented by Sharpnack arose in 1832, the question of what laws
the act incorporated was referred to the Supreme Court, and was sub-
mitted without argument. The Court's answer, in United States v.
Paul,5 is brief, and reported in full is:
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall stated it to be the opinion of the Court, that
the third section of the act of Congress, entitled "an act more effectually
to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States,
and for other purposes," passed March 3, 1825, is to be limited to the
laws of the several states in force at the time of its enactment. This was
ordered to be certified to the Circuit Court for the southern district of
New York. 16
Because of the absence of argument by counsel or Court, it was not
clear whether the Court's opinion rested on constitutional grounds
or on grounds of statutory construction. Both views have been ad-
vanced. Nearly all federal decisions discussing the point have as-
sumed the Paul rule to be one of statutory constnction,'7 although
at least one court cited the case in support of a constitutional con-
tention.'8 Interestingly, another federal judge cited Paul, soon after
it was decided, as authority for the theory that Congress constitu-
tionally had power to adopt prospective legislation of the states,"'
perhaps reasoning that as Marshall had not referred to a constitu-
tional limitation, there was none. Several state courts have cited
Paul, and other cases,20 for the proposition that referential statutes
24, 14 Stat. 13. Later reenactments referred to state laws "in force" on specified dates,
if remaining in force at the time of the alleged offense. Act of June 6, 1940, ch. 241, 54
Stat. 234; Act of June 20, 1935, ch. 284, 49 Stat. 394; Act of June 15, 1933, ch. 85, 48
State. 152; see Note, 70 HAmv. L. REv. 685 (1957).
15. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 141 (1832).
16. Id. at 142.
17. United States v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1, 11 (1910); Franklin v. United
States, 216 U.S. 559, 568 (1910); Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383,
398 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S.
149, 168 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United States v. Barney, 24 Fed. Cas. 1011
(No. 14,524) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1866).
18. Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773 (8th Cir. 1906).
19. "There is no doubt that congress may, by clear enactment, adopt the prospectivo
legislation of the states, and impart to it the effect of an act of the national government."
Gaines v. Travis, 9 Fed. Cas. 1062, 1064 (No. 5,180) (S.D.N.Y. 1849), citing Paul as
its authority.
20. One is Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). This case held
that the Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 105, providing that the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia was to have "all the powers by law vested in the circuit
courts . . .of the United States" referred to the powers provided in the Act of Feb.
13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, even though that act was repealed fifteen months later, and
all other circuit courts no longer had the power to issue writs of mandamus. Justices
[Vol. 43:89
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were limited in their application to persons, places, or things as they
existed at the time the statute was enacted.21 Most of the state courts
which have cited Paul have not read it so restrictively (or if they
did, have rejected it), and it is sometimes cited by them to support
the proposition that referential statutes do not adopt additions to or
modifications of the statute referred to, unless they do so by express
intent.22
Paul established that the 1825 act incorporated only state crimi-
nal laws in effect at the time the act was adopted; it might also
imply that the act was effective only as to federal enclaves in exist-
ence as such at that time.as But no change in the act was made until
1866. By that time a number of new states had been admitted to the
Union, and had adopted criminal laws. Some of the state criminal
laws in effect in 1825 had been repealed or revised- this was espe-
cially true where the state law had been primarily common law.
New federal enclaves existed, both in the recently admitted and the
older states. The Southern states had just entered the reconstruction
period and the extent of federal authority therein was unclear. All
these factors were an influence in the congressional decision to re-
write the Assimilative Crimes Act. As revised, the act was applicable
to federal enclaves then or thereafter in existence, but assimilated
only state laws "now in force," thus making clear the congressional
intent not to include prospective state legislation. 4 But to keep
the criminal law of the federal enclave substantially in accord
with that of its adjacent state, frequent reenactments were found
necessary.2 Finally, in 1948, while revising the Criminal Code of
Taney and Catron, dissenting, thought the repeal of the first act did affect the proper
interpretation of the second. Many courts would a with the dissenting judges on the
theory that the second act referred to general rather than to specific law. DzirEaso.v,
L anxsLAvrim DRAFMG § 8.2 (1954).
21. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 20 Ohio 8 (1851) (holding inapplicable to defendant a
statute prohibiting sale of liquor in certain counties, within three miles of an iron
furnace- defendant's liquor store had been established some time before the law was
enacted but within one of the counties referred to; after enactment an iron furnace was
erected within three miles of his store).
22. Daniels v. State, 150 Ind. 348, 351, 50 N.E. 74, 75 (1898); Calumet Foundry &
Machine Co. v. Mroz, 79 Ind. App. 305, 315, 137 N.E. 627, 630 (1922); State v.
Beckner, 197 Iowa 1252, 1255, 198 N.W. 643, 644 (1924); Commonwealth v. Fuller,
9 Mass. (8 Met.) 313, 317 (1844); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Auditor General, 109
Mich. 134, 137, 66 N.W. 956, 957 (1896); Marston v. Yaites, 66 S.W. 867, 868 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1901). In re Lloyd, 51 Kan. 501, 503, 33 Pac. 307, 308 (1893), treats Paul
and Hall v. State as inapplicable because based on statutes unlike the one involved in
that case. Tova v. State, 32 DeL (2 W. W. Harr.) 516, 525, 126, AtL. 627, 630 (1924),
assumes Paul and Hall are in accord, and rejects Paul by saying: "There are no reasons
given by [that] ...court for so deciding'; and also by holding both cases factually
inapplicable. For a somewhat similar reaction to Paul, see Unite States v. Dustin, 25
Fed. Cas. 946, 947 (No. 15,012) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1872).
23. United States v. Barney, 24 Fed. Cas. 1011 (No. 14,524) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1866).
24. Act of April 5, 1866, ch. 24, § 2, 14 Stat. 13.
25. See note 14 supra.
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the United States, Congress rewrote the Assimilative Crimes Act to
refer to the state laws "in force at the time of" the alleged offense.
It was thought this would make unnecessary the periodic reenact-
ments to keep abreast of changes in state laws, and would promote
uniformity between the law of an enclave and that of its adjoining
state.2 O
The principal constitutional arguments against incorporation by
reference of prospective legislation, to be examined subsequently in
greater detail, are based on due process (the difficulty of ascer-
taining applicable law, and the lack of uniformity in application),
and on improper delegation of legislative power. Mr. Justice Burton,
writing for the seven-judge majority in Sharpnack, dealt with the
due process issues without referring to due process and without
citing authorities in support of his position. He said that a differ-
ent code may be adopted for each federal enclave and that whether
Congress set forth the state laws in full or by reference, the result-
ing federal law would be as definite and ascertainable as the state
laws themselves. In addition, citing only one of the many cases
discussing the implications of Paul, he held Paul to decide only a
question of statutory construction rather than the constitutional
issue which Sharpnack presented.2 7 To these conclusions the dis-
senters, Mr. Justice Douglas (with Mr. Justice Black concurring),
made no comment.
Justice Burton's principal argument, once having decided that
Congress could adopt local law for the adjoining enclave and could
keep such adoption current, is that adoption which includes pro-
spective state laws is not a delegation of congressional legislative
authority to the states. He considers such adoption to be "a practical
accommodation of the mechanics of the legislative ftmctions of
State and Nation in the field of police power where it is especially
appropriate to make the federal regulation of local conduct conform
with that already established by the State." 28 He points out that
Congress has made use of future state legislation a number of times
"in connection with the exercise of federal legislative power" and
cites one case holding that such a statute did not improperly dele-
gate legislative power..29 He also refers to cases upholding delega-
tion to local legislative bodies of broad powers where Congress has
retained power to revise, alter or revoke the local legislation." But
26. Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), referred to in United States v. Sharp-
nack, 355 U.S. 286, 292 n.8 (1958).
27. Justice Burton refers to Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 568 (1910),
which is in complete accord with his position as to Paul, but which, as the Assimilative
Crimes Act then referred only to existing law, may be only dictum.
28. 855 U.S. at 294.
29. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. R.R., 242 U.S. 311, 326 (1917).
30. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 106,
109-10 (1953).
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no reference is made to the numerous state court decisions dealing
with the same problem of delegation of power under state constitu-
tions. Apparently important to Justice Burton is the fact that if a
state should adopt a criminal law which Congress felt inappropriate
for an adjacent federal enclave, Congress could act to make it
ineffective for that enclave.31
The dissenting justices agree that Congress may incorporate some
prospective legislation, but object to this particular incorporation
as involving an inadequate determination of basic policy to guide
the states. To illustrate his objection, Justice Douglas suggests that
Congress could adopt for a federal enclave "the state law governing
speeding as it may from time to time be enacted," for it has deter-
mined the basic policy-thou shalt not speed. But this delegation
was a blanket one -thou shalt not offend. Some state criminal laws,
such as a blue law, or a segregation law, could become federal
crimes under this statute, he argues, even though a majority in Con-
gress would never specifically have approved such laws.3 - Justice
Douglas is thinking in part of the problem of delegation to admin-
istrative officials, where Congress has been required to prescribe
adequate guide lines for administrative action.'
The majority opinion by its terms applies only to the incorpora-
tion in the Assimilative Crimes Act of subsequently adopted state
legislation, and holds that action, under the limitations prescribed
by the Court, to be "a reasonable exercise of congressional legisla-
tive power and discretion." 34 But the limitations apparently pre-
scribed, at most, are that Congress act under the federal police
power, that it reasonably decide in its discretion whether to incor-
porate prospective legislation, and that it retain power to change
the law if displeased by any subsequent state legislation that would
otherwise have been automatically incorporated.
II. RATONALE FOR INCORPORATING BY REFERFNCE
An understanding of the reasons for incorporating any material
into statutes by reference is helpful to an understanding of the rea-
sons for incorporation of prospective material as well. Objectors to
any incorporation see it as a device to adopt clauses and provisions
which, if fully spelled out and understood by all legislators, might
fail of passage. 5 The alertness of newspapermen and lobbyists coy-
31. See 355 U.S. at 294, 296.
32. See 355 U.S. at 298-99.
33. He refers to Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See
DAvis, Amu.rTsmvE LAw 53-54, 86 (1951).
34. 355 U.S. at 297.
35. Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?, 25 MN'N. L. RL v. 261, 277
(1941); Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 IoWA L. RFX.
-705,707 (1953).
19581
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ering a legislative session would be some check on actions so moti-
vated.36 Ordinarily, the incorporation technique is used not for evil
motives but for convenience, and, perhaps more important, to
achieve some desired uniformity or conformity. (A danger which
must always be recognized is that because of insufficient analysis
of the material referred to or careless language, the result will be
confusion and ambiguity.3 7)
Convenience is achieved where making laws by reference saves
time and energy for draftsman and legislator, and results in a less
bulky code or book of statutes. Although the language used must be
precise, there will be much less wrestling over exact language. Ex-
tensive legislation, such as a major part of the Federal Internal
Revenue Code, may be placed on a state's statute books as state
law, with little printing cost. Imagine the problem a state would
face in enacting the substance of the Internal Revenue Code other-
wise, especially without typographical errors.
Why is uniformity or conformity important? Some hint of the
answer, from the federal viewpoint, can be drawn from the previous
discussion of the Assimilative Crimes Act. The main significance of
the crimes involved, federally, is not their nature but the fact that
they occurred on federal territory. It may have been happenstance
that the occurrence was on federal rather than state territory. The
acts involved were primarily matters with which the states had con-
cerned themselves, and local policies, whatever they might be, were
acceptable to Congress. 3 Let the criminal law of each enclave, as to
such crimes, be that of the adjoining state. One commentator has
36. The effectiveness of such checks depend on the understanding of ach grou .
(Some newspapermen regularly covering legislative sessions display more understanN-
ing of the consequences of a proposed law than many legislators - especially where, as
in many states, there has been frequent turnover in the membership of the legislature.)
37. Poldervaart, supra note 35, at 708. A common example of in future reference
found in state laws is a statement of canons of statutory construction ordinarily to be
applicable to legislation now in force or thereafter enacted. See, e.g., IowA CoDE § § 4.1,
4.2 (1954). A danger of this type of reference, which incorporates itself into other stat-
utes, is that it may be overlooked by lawyers and judges at times when its use in inter-
preting some statute would be highly relevant. Where incorporation by reference effects
a change in policy, some consequences may be overlooked and unprovided for. By in-
corporating existing federal income tax law, Iowa for the first time imposed a state
income tax on capital gains. No provision was made for those taxpayers who, for federal
income tax purposes, were reporting income from sales in previous years on some in-
stallnent method. To some extent this and several similar problems were dealt with
by regulations of the State Tax Commission. Hayes, The New Iowa Income Tax Regula-
tions, 5 DRAKE L. REv. 15, 17 (1955).
38. Justice Burton stated, in a footnote, 355 U.S. 286, 293 n.9, that the Court was
not passing on the effect of the Assimilative Crimes Act where a state law which could
be assimilated is in conflict with a specific federal criminal statute or with federal
policy. He referred to several cases, among them Williams v. United States, 327 U.S.
711 (1946) (applying federal age limit of 16 rather than state limit of 18 in statutory
rape case), and Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944) (dissent
thought Oklahoma statute against transportation of liquor to destinations in state was
[Vol. 43:89
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suggested the adoption of a similar assimilative statute for civil
matters, occurring in federal enclaves, that under our federal scheme
are primarily left to state control.39
Many state legislatures have made some reference to federal laws.
This may occur where the state is attempting to supplement federal
law, as in the migratory bird, 40 prohibition, 4  narcotics and little
NJRA' situations. The state may wish to take advantage of some
federal "grant-in-aid" program, or other form of aid to the states.
For example, nearly every state has attempted through referential
legislation to take advantage of the eighty percent credit in the
basic federal estate tax.4 A failure of a state's law, advertent or
inadvertent, to conform to federal law, may result in loss of some
"grant-in-aid" benefits.44
A state may also wish to take advantage of the experience and
decisions of some federal agency. A federal health or quality stand-
ard may be useful.45 The work of a federal agency searching out
violators of federal law can be utilized by the state, where state law
conforms. As an example, in the income tax area the state can "ride-
the coat-tails" of federal tax laws and their enforcement." Thus, the
state's administrative problems may be reduced and perhaps a
assimilated, and federal law thereby violated, where liquor was transported to an offi-
cers' club at an army post in Oklahoma). See discussion of this problem in Note, 70
HAnv. L. REv. 685, 691 (1957).
39. Note, 18 Go. Wxsm L. BR-v. 500, 509 (1950).
40. See, e.g., TmEN. CODE ANN. § 51-609 (1955).
41. In re Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 138 N.E. 453 (1921) (statute held
unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483, 119 AtL 551 (1923)
(statute held constitutional).
42. Notes, 34 CoLm. L. Rav. 1077 (1934); 33 Micro L. RBv. 597 (1935); 8 U.
Chic. L. REv. 310 (1934). See also Clark, Interdependent Federal and State Law as a
Form of Federal-State Cooperation, 23 IowA L. REv. 539 (1938); Koenig, Federal and
State Cooperation Under the Constitution, 36 MNfcE. L. REy. 752 (1938); Note, 27
VA. L. Rav. 700 (1941).
43. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 451.1-.13 (1954); MtcE. STAT. ANN. § 7.563 (1950);
Mn,. STAT. ANN. §§ 291.34-.40 (1947). This type of statute was upheld in Brown v.
State, 323 Mo. 138, 19 S.W.2d 12 (1929), as not incorporation by reference but as
using the federal law only to identify the minimum tax.
44. Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 Iow& L. Rt-.
705,707 (1953).
45. Hutchins v. Mayo, 143 Fla. 707, 197 So. 495 (1940) (statute held unconstitu-
tional); State v. Hotel Bar Foods, 18 N.J. 115, 12 A.2d 726 (1955) (statute held
constitutional). The Florida case is criticised in Note, 70 HAv. L. Rv. 685, 688 n.33
(1957).
46. Kamins, Federally-Based State Income Taxes, 9 NAT'L TAx J. 46 (1956); Note,
17 MoNr. L. REv. 203 (1956). See also Hayes, The New Iowa Income Tax Regulations,
5 Dna L. Rv. 15 (1955); Lockyer, History of the Kentucky Income Tax Law, 43
Ky. L.J. 461, 475 (1955); Miller, The New Iowa Income Tax Law, 41 IowA L. Ry.
85 (1955); Miller, Proposal for a Federally-Based New York Personal Income Tax, 13
TAx L. REv. 183, 193-95 (1958). In Ballard-Hassett Co. v. Local Bd. of Review, 215
Iowa 556,246 N.W. 277 (198), a reference in the state's moneys and credits tax statute
to the federal statute defining "moneyed capital was upheld as a reference for defini-
tional purposes rather than one to "fix the tax - therefore not violating IowA Co.VsT.
art. 7, § 7: "it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such tax or objecL"
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smaller staff needed to enforce the state's laws.47 It is in this area
of income taxes that there has been much agitation, recently, for
state conformance to federal law. One of the strong forces for this
is generated by taxpayers and their counsel.48 Conformity greatly
simplifies the task of reporting taxable income. Federal regulations
and decisions under federal law are of more interpretive value when
incorporation is used. Uncertainties and ambiguities in the statute
are more readily reduced.
But, admitting the virtues of uniformity, and skirting the dangers
of careless drafting that may promote confusion instead, is incor-
poration by reference necessary to achieve that goal? After all, there
is the example of the various uniform laws which have been promul-
gated, and which no state adopting them has incorporated by refer-
ence. But what uniform law has been adopted in full, without
change by some legislature? 49 Incorporation by reference would
avoid the modifications imposed by those legislators who cannot
resist the urge to tinker with words. And experience has shown that,
as each state has its own text, its courts feel free to interpret and to
disagree with other courts construing identical language in the
47. Some attorneys feel that state tax administration personnel tend, for reasons of
state economy and politics, to be less capable than similar employees of til Internal
Revenue Service; and that their clients may be unduly and unwarrantedly harassed
because of this. (At the time I was connected with the Iowa State Tax Commission
several of the Income Tax Division employees seemed to me to be highly competent.
At least one, however, is no longer with the commission, primarily because there was a
change in the political party in control.) Several supporters of state bills adopting fed-
eral income tax law undoubtedly hope they will result in substantial elimination of most
state auditing of returns.
48. Although some states had from time to time revised their laws to make the text
conform to federal provisions, in many instances this was not done, was not done com-
pletely, or was not done promptly. Abdnor, Notable Differences in State and Federal
Income Tax Statutes, 38 MINN. L. RBv. 1 (1953); Kinsey, Comparison of the Oregon
Personal and Corporation Income-Tax Laws with the Federal Income-Tax Law (2 pts.),
29 ORE. L. REv. 120, 175 (1950); Kurz, Variations in Colorado and Federal Income
Tax Laws, 30 DICTA 24 (1953); Miller, Proposal for a Federally-Based New York
Personal Income Tax, 13 TAx L. REv. 183 (1958). "General conformity ... sometimes
leads practitioners to overlook or fail to recognize the differences that do exist." Abdnor,
supra at 3.
Conformity of state to federal taxable income had the support of many Iowa lawyers
who felt that the small fee they charged (around $5) to prepare a state return was not
commensurate with cost if there was non-conformity. And at the same time they did not
want further to encourage the growth of the insurance agent, butcher, barber, or baker
"tax adviser." Some degree of non-conformity remains in Iowa, the most notable ex-
amples being the lack of "split-income" provisions, and the manner of handling
personal exemptions and credit for dependents. The lawyer must determine whether
filing of separate or joint returns is to the best advantage of his client, and if separate
returns are advisable he faces a problem of how properly to allocate deductions.
49. See Byers, Microfilming of Business Records, 6 DRAKE L. REv, 74, 86-87 (1957),
which describes the many modifications to the UNIFO M PHOTOGrIAPIUC COPIES OF
BUSINESS AND PuBLIC RECORns As EVIDENCE ACT. Hardly any Uniform Act has been
adopted without modification by some legislature. Some modifications are dictated by
local necessity, but others seem based on the feeling that "we can do a better job" of
writing the law, "uniformity be damned."
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statutes of their states.50 Incorporation by reference probably would
not eliminate completely differing interpretations in different juris-
dictions (especially where a point is first decided by a court of the
incorporating state), but the decisions of courts of the originating
jurisdiction probably would have more force.
Both convenience and uniformity can be obtained, to a consider-
able extent, even though only existing law is incorporated. But if
the incorporated statute is one which is subject to frequent changes,
uniformity rapidly disappears, and there is a question of the con-
venient way to handle the resulting problems. Where a state has
incorporated by reference portions of the existing federal income tax
law only, nearly every federal amendment would call for prompt
state action if the administrator and some taxpayers and attorneys
are not to be confronted with difficult adjustments. Many state
legislatures are not in continuous session; some meet regularly for
a short time every other year, and are pressed by all kinds of busi-
ness during their session; calling special sessions may be undesirable
either politically or because of cost factors. For these reasons, if the
objectives of conformity or uniformity and of convenience are to be
obtained in the most useful fashion, it may be desirable to incorpo-
rate both existing law and future modifications thereof.
Il. ARE REFERENCES TO PROSPECTIVE CEANcES IMPRoPER?
As other writers have indicated, the principal evils seen in incor-
poration of existing legislation are threefold: "(1) the difficult), of
ascertaining just what it is that is being incorporated by the refer-
ence; (2) the opportunity it affords unscrupulous legislators and
lobbyists to secure enactment of legislation which otherwise would
fail of passage; and (3) the increased likelihood of improvident
legislation enacted 'without that intelligent consideration and under-
standing of the matters involved which is so essential to the procure-
ment of wise and wholesome legislation."' L1 Despite these factors,
incorporation by reference, at least of existing legislation, has long
been permitted, sometimes in the face of constitutional provisions
apparently forbidding its use.52
There are a number of courts which have said flatly that future
modifications of a referred law cannot be incorporated, sometimes
50. "By actual count there are eighty sections of the N.LL. that have different
meamngs in different states as a result of conflicting court decisions in the several
states." Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code as Enacted in Massachusetts, 18
Bus. LAw. 490 (1958).
51. Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 Iowa L. RBv.
705, 707 (1953). See also Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth Wi le?, 25 Mnsm. L.
REv. 261, 277 (1941).
52. FrxuND, LEGS.TIVE REcULATiON § 16 (1932); 1 SuHEnLAi., STATUrES A ND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1925 (3d ed. 1943); Poldervaart, supra note 51, at 708-16.
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citing cases supposedly supporting, without discussion of the basis
for such holding. From the decisions and writers analyzing the issue,
it would seem that three constitutional objections may be raised
involving: (1) due process, in that the referring law may be un-
clear, (2) equal protection because discrimination results; and (3)
legislative authority, in that the legislature has improperly delegated
its power, particularly objectionable in this case since the legislature
is unable to control the law of its jurisdiction.
Due Process- Clarity and Definiteness
As indicated, one claim of objectors to incorporation of in futuro
material is that due process provisions or their equivalent are vio-
lated, because the law enacted is not certain, clear or definite. This
objection runs against incorporation of existing laws as well. Refer-
ence makes it necessary to look well beyond the four comers of the
statute to ascertain its meaning, often to material outside the laws
of the enacting jurisdiction."
In some instances ascertaining the meaning of a statute is difficult
even though no incorporation by reference is involved."' Un-
doubtedly incorporation by reference may increase interpretation
difficulties.5 And particularly troublesome is a general reference
such as was found in Town of Conway v. Lee,"0 where a town ordi-
nance provided that all acts constituting state statutory or common-
law crimes should also be an offense against the town. This was held
to be an improper reference, and the opinion contains some talk
about the difficulty in having to examine yearly volumes of stat-
utes." While the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act presents similar
difficulties, none of the justices in Sharpnack felt that there was
sufficient lack of certainty, clarity or definiteness to violate the
federal constitution.
Except for instances of reciprocal legislation, which perhaps are
53. "The person who would know the law and avoid penalty must obtain tho statutes
of another jurisdiction and read those, obtain the rules, read them, and then keep up on
all changes both in the statute and the rules." WALKR, Tirs LEGISLATIVE PnocEss
344 (1948); Poldervaart, supra note 51, at 720-21. See also McCartin, The Constittu-
tionality of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 17 FED. B.J. 157, 164 (1957); Note,
1950 Wis. L. REv. 726, 729.
54. If one could tell what a statute means, just by staring intently at Its four corners
and the stuff inside them, what purpose would sets of annotated codes and statutes
serve?
55. Note, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 736, at 729 n.21, points out by way of illustration that
interpretation of one Wisconsin statute, Wis. STAT. § 231.21(3), requires examination
of seven different chapters of the statutes to ascertain the proper procedure to sell trust
property.
56. 209 S.C. 11, 38 S.E.2d 914 (1946).
57. But many American states have general reference statutes incorporating English
common law. Some of the problems presented by such general references are described
in Poldervaart, supra, note 51, at 732-34.
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not properly referential statutes, 58 it is rare for one state to incorpo-
rate by reference a law of another state. In view of the difficulties in
ascertaining and understanding the referring law which would re-
sult, such an incorporation might be found to offend due process.
Occasional references have been made to materials prepared by
some private organization, as, for example, the "National Electrical
Code" of a National Board of Fire Underwriters Associations,"0 the
New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy,60 and a medical associa-
tion's list of accredited medical schools." Some of these references
have been held improper, in opinions resting primarily on grounds
of improper delegation of legislative authority but usually including,
or apparently influenced by, arguments based on the difficulty pres-
ent in determining the law's meaning. A "due-process" concern that
the law of State A should change automatically when State B
changes its law, or Association X in State C revises its approved
code or list may be reasonable if most of A's citizens are in a poor
position to learn of the changes.
Where State A's reference is to another of its own laws, concern
over inability to ascertain the law is less justified, and most opinions
dealing with this type of reference revolve therefore only around
ascertainment of legislative intent. What about reference by State A
to federal law, or by Congress to a state law? This does involve
reference from one jurisdiction to another, but in view of our federal
system and resulting dual relationships the situation is not the same
as a reference from State A to State B. Everyone in State A is sub-
ject to the laws of State A and also to those of the federal govern-
ment. 6 2 In some instances, such as the income tax situation, State
A's income tax may be clearer if the state has incorporated federal
law by reference than if it has its own full text; and a person violat-
ing the Assimilative Crimes Act may have been more familiar with
the criminal law of the adjoining state than with federal criminal
58. See Starr, Reciprocal and Retaliatory Legislation in the American States, 21
MnN. L. REv. 371 (1937).
59. KAx. GENr. STAT. § 4863 (1915), held to be unconstitutional in State v. Craw-
ford, 104 Kan. 141, 177 Pac. 360 (1919).
60. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 28 Ariz. 22, 235
Pac. 137 (1925), construing a state fire insurance law requiring use of the policy form
known as the "New York Standard" as it "now or may hereafter be constituted," held
that reference could be made to the existing form but not to its subsequent modifica-
tion, and held the statute constitutional to the extent it referred to an existing form.
61. Such a reference was held unconstitutional, in State v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d
131, 310 P.2d 261 (1957). But other courts have permitted it. Ex parte Gerino, 148
Cal. 412, 77 Pac. 166 (1904), followed in Arwine v. Board of Medical Examiners, 151
Cal. 499, 91 Pac. 319 (1907); see Jones v. Kansas State Bd. of Medical Registration
and Examination, 111 Kan. 813, 208 Pac. 689 (1922).
62. It is sometimes argued that each state's domestic law includes not only that of
its own legislature and courts but also federal legislation. Farui'm, LEIsLAT-vE BREau-
LArioN § 16 (1932); See Ex parte Lasswell, 1 CaL App. 2d 183, 203, 36 P.2d 678, 687
(1934).
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law. For these reasons there may be less of a due process problem
in the federal-state and state-federal type of reference, than is pres-
ent in the reference by State A to laws of State B.
Discrimination
An argument which may primarily be directed toward the Assimi-
lative Crimes Act and some other federal referential legislation is
that of discrimination. McCartin 63 illustrates this with the example
of a father, visiting his soldier son stationed at an army post in State
K, who while on the post sells his car either to the son or to another
soldier on Sunday. State K has a law prohibiting Sunday sales, and
this sale in federal territory may therefore be in violation of the
Assimilative Crimes Act. But were the army post in State 0, which
has no such Sunday law, no federal crime would be committed. It
must be noted that even though the father was from State N and
unfamiliar with the laws of either K or 0, if he made the sale out-
side the enclave and on adjoining land in state jurisdiction, he would
have committed an offense in K but not in 0. The objection, then,
is not because of the father's lack of knowledge, and is not primarily
addressed to the in futuro aspect of the reference.
A somewhat similar problem in federal-state relations was resolved
in Erie v. Tompkins 4 to allow results in federal courts to vary ac-
cording to state law in diversity cases. The Sharpnack opinion indi-
cates that Congress could enact a complete code for each enclave
and the fact that the various codes differed would not be unconsti-
tutional discrimination. If so, it was reasoned, neither would an
incorporation by reference such as Sharpnack involved. The princi-
pal case on which a discrimination argument can be supported is
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart." It involved an amen ent to
the Judiciary Act regarding the admiralty jurisdiction of federal
courts, which preserved to injured employees engaged in maritime
work not only their common-law remedy (previously saved)"' but
also any rights and remedies under the applicable state workmen's
compensation law. Speaking for a five-man majority, Mr. Justice
McReynolds held that the amendment exceeded the power of Con-
gress, primarily because it improperly delegated legislative power,
but also because it resulted in inconsistent maritime law from area
to area. Mr. Justice Holmes, for the dissent, thought the amendment
constitutional, and pointed out that the Court previously had sus-
63. McCartin, The Constitutionality of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 17 FeD.
B.J. 157, 165 (1957).
64. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1988).
65. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
66. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), the Court had held that
this did not preserve, in admiralty, remedies under state workmen's compensation
laws; the amendment was intended to overrule that case.
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tained a law directing common-law practice in the district courts
to conform as near as possible to that prevailing in state courts. Mr.
Justice Burton's opinion cites Holmes' Knickerbocker dissent, and
in a footnote refers to the majority opinion ("which we do not
now reexamine") as based on a supposed constitutional requirement
of "'harmony and uniformity' of law throughout the admiralty
jurisdiction."67 No other court appears to have utilized the discrimi-
nation argument to decide that a referential law was improper-
and this argument should have little bearing on the question
whether incorporation of in futuro material is improper when exist-
ing material could properly be referred to.
Delegation
The objection most strongly asserted against incorporation of
future legislation, rules or materials, at least from bodies other than
the legislature proposing to act by reference, is that an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power will occur.!8 This argument in
many instances is not based on prohibitory language to be found in
the federal or a state constitution, but is read into the constitution
by implication from theories of separation of powers. Support for
this is found in constitutional phrases, such as: "All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representa-
tives";69 in writings of various philosophers, such as Montesquieu, 70
and of legal writers, such as Cooley;71 and in precedent.
That the language of most constitutions does not necessarily for-
bid the legislature from delegating portions of its power, at least
subject to adequate supervision, is apparent; delegation to munici-
palities has long been permitted, and many courts will permit a
limited amount of delegation to administrative bodies when they
find the legislature has set adequate standards for action. -2 Our
attention has been called elsewhere to the fact that theories of
67. 355 U.S. 286, 294 n.10 (1958).
68. See Read, Is Referential Legislation Worth While?, 25 Mnm. L. R1v. 261, 283
(1941); Notes, 8 U. CiNc. L. 1Ewv. 310 (1934); 25 VA. L. REv. 700 (1941).
69. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 1.
70. LuCE, L GaSLArvE PRoBLEMs 4 (1935). Mr. Luce, at 502, says: 'The remark-
able thing is that the expounders of the maxim [that there can be no delegation] them-
selves admit such serious modifications, limitations, and exceptions that a critic may
fairly ask whether in fact it has anything but artificial vitality."
71. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITuTIONAL LnTrrAonoNs 224 (8th ed. 1927). These references
usually ignore immediately subsequent paragraphs pointing out some qualifications to
the doctrine of nondelegability. Id. at 227-32.
79 ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912); United States v. Crimaud,
220 U.S. 506 (1911); Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905) (utilizing
rules by committees of miners in the locality, regarding location of claims); Buttfield
v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); D&vis,
ADxmu -ATIvE LAw 86 (1951).
1958]
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philosophers, economists and political scientists are not by implica-
tion part of our constitutions 13 - though they may be relevant in
interpretation of the language used by the draftsmen. Legal writers
are not in agreement that reference to in futuro material is uncons ti-
tutional.71 And, despite language found in some opinions to the
contrary,75 a considerable number of cases would uphold such refer-
ences in many instances.
Prior to Sharpnack two lower federal courts in assimilative crimes
cases clearly took the position that adoption of prospective legisla-
tion was improper delegation, an abdication of legislative duties.'
In both the discussion on this point was dictum, as in each the as-
similative statute by its terms applied only to state law in existence
at the time of the last previous reenactment of the statute. Mr. Jus-
tice Fuller avoided the issue, in Franklin v. United States, saying of
the statute which then referred only to existing law:
73. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics." Holmes, J., dissenting, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
74. Perhaps Cooley should be understood as considering such references unconsti-
tutional. See note 71 supra. McCartin and others have considered specific acts of this
type to be invalid, and from their arguments appear to believe that practically all stat-
utes making this type of reference are unconstitutional. McCartin, The Constitutionality
of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 17 FED. B.J. 157 (1957); Note, 8 U. CINc. L.
REv. 310 (1934). But the contrary position has been strongly urged:
[T]he better view favors the validity ... [of such statutes. Even] where
another legislature may change not only the operation of local law but its
substantive content, the statute should be sustained for its enactment has not
amounted to any permanent loss of sovereignty or legislative power ...
The advantages gained by uniformity of law between the states and the
advantage of uniformity with congressional legislation, to say nothing of pro-
tection against retaliatory legislation, outweighs the disadvantages which
may temporarily arise from changes in foreign laws.
2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 310 (3d ed. 1943). Suth-
erland, op. cit. supra, § 5208 points out that: "State statutes have been passed which
adopted federal statutes with the administrative rulings to be made under them. These
acts have been received badly, most of them being declared unconstitutional for dele-
gating legislative power to the administrative board. . . . [But] if sufficient standards
are prescribed for the administrative rulings, the acts may be held constitutional."
75. See State v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d 261 (1957), and Brock v.
Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 291, 299, 71 P.2d 209, 213 (1937). The Brock court, dis-
cussing references to rules and regulations of the federal Secretary of Agriculture in
provisions for state-sanctioned marketing agreements, said that "the attempt to make
future regulations of another jurisdiction part of the state law is generally hold to be
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power." The court then decided that the
question was not really in issue, so did not have to be decided. Other in futuro refer-
ences in California legislation have been held constitutional, both before and after
Brock, although only Brock is frequently cited by courts outside California. People v.
Oyama, 29 Cal. 2d 164, 173 P.2d 794 (1946), rev'd on other grounds sub. noa. Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. City and County of
San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d 101, 124 P.2d 25 (1942); Arwine v. Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, 151 Cal. 499, 91 Pac. 319 (1907); Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 77 Pac. 66
(1904); Ex parte Lasswell, 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P.2d 678 (1934).
76. Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773 (8th Cir. 1906); United States v.
Barnaby, 51 Fed. 20, 23 (C.C.D. Mont. 1892).
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There is, plainly, no delegation to the States of authority in any way to
change the criminal laws applicable to places over which the United States
has jurisdiction.77
Justice Burton recognized that Franklin had not involved the issue
of in futuro incorporation. He ignored the two lower court decisions
just mentioned, which some state courts have cited, and their dicta
must inferentially be taken as overruled by Sharpnack.
As noted in the discussion of the discrimination objection, one of
the points made by Mr. Justice McReynolds in Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Stewart, was that of improper delegation: "Congress can not
transfer its legislative power to the States-by nature this is non-
delegable.""8 Five cases are cited in support of the quoted state-
ment Each contains supporting language; but in each case the
statute challenged as unlawfully delegating legislative power was
upheld either on the theory that the delegee was only finding a fact
essential to the effectiveness or application of the law, or was adopt-
ing permissible supplementary regulations.79 Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting and joined by Justices Brandeis, Clarke, and Pitney, ar-
gued that the amendment should be read to incorporate only exist-
ing state law, under the Paul rule, but that in any event:
I assume that Congress could not delegate to state legislatures the simple
power to decide what the law of the United States should be in that dis-
trict. But when institutions are established for ends within the power of
the States and not for any purpose of affecting the lav of the United
States, I take it to be an admitted power of Congress to provide that the
law of the United States shall conform as nearly as may be to what for the
time being exists. A familiar example is the law directing the common-law
practice, etc., in the District Courts to 'conform, as near as may be, to the
practice,' etc., 'existing at the time' in the State Courts. Rev. Stats. § 914.
This was held by the unanimous court to be binding in Amy v. Watertown,
180 U.S. 301.8°
An act establishing certain forest reservations had authorized
the Secretary of Agriculture to set up rules and regulations for their
77. Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 566 (1910).
78. 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1919).
79. ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912) (ICC could by rule require
submission of reports and uniform acceounting, even as to intrastate transportation
activities); Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905) (in disposing of public
lands, regulations by local legislatures or committees of miners regarding location of
claims could be applied; such rules are "supplementary regulations,) not acts of "legis-
lative character in the highest sense of the term." 196 U.S. at 126); Buttfield v. Strana-
han, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (administrative officials may establish standards regarding
impure or unwholesome tea, as to which the statute forbade importation); Field v.
Clark, 148 U.S. 649 (1892) (under a tariff act, the President could suspend free im-
portation of certain goods where the exporting country imposed reciprocally unequal
duties on American products); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1890) (federal act upheld
which permitted state prohibition laws to apply to imported liquor while still in the
original package).
80. 253 U.S. at 169.
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use, and provided that violations of such rules and regulations were
crimes."' In United States v. Grimaud "' the defendant demurred to
an indictment for grazing sheep in one of the reservations without
obtaining the permit required by a rule adopted pursuant to that
act, arguing unlawful delegation of legislative power. The Court
assumed that some delegations would be improper, but held this
was not. "It must be admitted that it is difficult to define the line
which separates legislative power to make laws, from administrative
authority to make regulations." 8 3 Here, though, the "violation ...
is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress. The statute,
not the Secretary, fixes the penalty." 84
In two significant cases federal statutes have been invalidated on
delegation of power arguments, both dealing with aspects of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and powers given therein
to the President."' Neither case cites Knickerbocker, although refer-
ring to the cases cited therein and to other cases, such as Grimaud.
In one, after analysis of various cases, the Court said: "Thus, in
every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has
recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no con-
stitutional authority to transcend." 6 This would indicate that dele-
gation is limited, but not forbidden. Is one limitation that there shall
be no incorporation by reference of legislation as it may be modi-
fied? The majority in Knickerbocker seemed so to hold, although
Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out that the conformity laws had been
sustained though referring to state court practice existing at the
time the federal court acted.8 7 This sustaining, plus the feeling that
Congress retained control of basic policy, influenced the Sharpnack
Court to conclude that on the facts presented there had been no
improper delegation of congressional legislative power in violation
of federal constitutional requirements. This, of course, is not directly
determinative of the problems state courts must face when con-
struing state court constitutions. Nor does it have any bearing on
the question whether a state delegation presents federal constitu-
tional questions regarding power to delegate (a question which
apparently has not been raised in any case and one that is not likely
to arise).
Most of the state cases dealing with incorporation by reference
of federal laws, federal administrative rules and standards, or stand-
81. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 526, 26 Stat. 1103, as amended by Act of Feb.
1, 1905, ch. 288, § 1, 33 Stat. 628.
82. 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
83. Id. at 517.
84. Id. at 522.
85. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
86. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra note 85, at 430. (Emphasis added.)
87. Amy v. Watertown (No. 1), 130 U.S. 301 (1889).
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ards promulgated by private agencies, as now or hereafter in effect,
make little reference to federal decisions. Some, strildng down such
legislation, do so without citation of any supporting authority. In
many instances a case holding such a reference invalid can be bal-
anced with another holding an identical or almost identical refer-
ence valid.
Among the first cases dealing with state reference to future
federal laws were those involving legislation enacted by some states,
after adoption of the eighteenth amendment, which supplemented
federal prohibition laws and which defined "intoxicating liquors" by
reference to existing or subsequent federal definitions. Several
courts, in frequently cited opinions, have called this an unlawful
delegation of legislative powers, and an abdication by the repre-
sentatives of the people of their power, privilege and duty to enact
laws."" One of these opinions contains perhaps the best expression
of the nondelegability argument against constitutionality:
[Legislative power] cannot be surrendered or delegated or performed
by any other agency. The enactment of laws is one of the high preroga-
tives of a sovereign power. It would be destructive of fundamental
conceptions of government through republican institutions for the repre-
sentatives of the people to abdicate their exclusive privilege and obliga-
tion to enact laws.8 9
But another court sustained a similar state prohibition law as merely
augmentative and deferring to the superior authority of federal
law.90
Similar state supplementary action occurred in connection with
NIRA and OPA. Some states in 1933-1934 set up state recovery
administrations, often making the codes adopted under federal laws
applicable to the state regulation. Although it had been argued that
such statutes were invalid,9" in Ex parte Lasswel 92 a state statute
was upheld as not unwarranted delegation. The court applied a
primary standard" concept (that the state had made the federal
code to be adopted a standard of fair competition), and argued that
88. In re Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 133 N.E. 453 (1921). To the same
effect, see State v. Vino Medical'Co., 121 Me. 438, 117 At. 588 (1992). In re Burke,
190 Cal. 326, 212 Pac. 193 (1923), sustained a similar California law as referring only
to existing federal law, there being no federal changes to clutter the picture. The court
said: "It may be conceded [counsel had] that this provision [referring to federal law as
changed] is not valid, although we do not decide it, since it is not involved." 190 Cal.
at 328, 212 Pac. at 194.
89. In re Opinion of the Justices, 239 Mass. 606, 610, 133 N.E. 453, 454 (1921).
90. Commonwealth v. Alderman, 275 Pa. 483, 119 At 551 (1923), as explained in
Holgate Bros. Co. v. Bashore, 331 Pa. 255, 269, 200 At. 672, 678 (1938).
91. Note, 8 U. CiNc. L. BREv. 310 (1934). Note, 34 CoLxmn. L. REv. 1077 (1934)
thought their validity uncertain. Note, 33 MxicF L. REv. 597 (1935), took the position
that the statutes could be upheld by a court satisfied that the term "fair competition"
defined an adequate standard for the guidance of administrative action.
92. 1 Cal. App. 2d 183, 36 P.2d 678 (2d App. Dist. 1934).
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this was legislation requiring administration to fill up the details. It
added: ". . . incidental powers may be delegated to a body or be
measured by a standard not under the control of the state and ...
they may be subject to change. . . . As will be noted later, Lass-
well sometimes is miscited by opponents of incorporation legislation.
Somewhat similar state laws and city ordinances which made a vio-
lation of OPA regulations a misdemeanor were upheld in two
states, 4 but held invalid in one which later attempted to distinguish
its holding to allow some incorporation of future federal laws."'
Smithberger v. Banning9 and State v. Crawford 97 are two often
cited cases which held referring statutes invalid on delegation
grounds. The first refers to federal laws which were then before
Congress for adoption and is an example of hasty, poor draftsman-
ship; 98 the latter refers to a code of a private association and could
well rest on a "due process" argument.99 The effect of each case has
been weakened by subsequent decisions from the same courts,'99
though this usually is overlooked.
In several instances a statute has been upheld as referring only to
existing law or materials, the court stating that reference therein to
93. 1 Cal. App. 2d 203, 36 P.2d at 687. The opposite result was reached in Darweger
v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 196 N.E. 61 (1935), but this decision may rest primarily on a
unique provision of the New York constitution.
94. People v. Sell, 310 Mich. 305, 17 N.W.2d 193 (1945); Mosher v. Haddock, 46
N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term 1944).
95. City of Cleveland v. Piskura, 145 Ohio St. 144, 60 N.E.2d 919 (1945); later
distinguished on the ground that the invalid law imperatively commanded or pro-
hibited performance of an act; but a law would be valid though incorporating future
federal laws if it only authorized or permitted performance of acts to which such laws
would apply. Opdyke v. Security Say. & Loan Co., 157 Ohio St. 121, 105 N.E.2d 9
(1952) (stockholders in state building and loan association unsuccessfully attempted
to enjoin its conversion into a federal saving and loan association, arguing that some
state-imposed conditions requiring compliance with federal laws and agency regula-
tions were improper delegations of legislative power).
96. 129 Neb. 651, 262 N.W. 492 (1935). See also Illinois Power & Light Corp. v.
City of Centralia, 11 F.Supp. 874 (E.D. MI1. 1935).
97. 104 Kan. 141, 177 Pac. 360 (1919).
98. See Poldervaart, Legislation by Reference-A Statutory Jungle, 38 IowA L.
REv. 705, 720 (1953).
99. In Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S.W.2d 517 (1946), a statute
was upheld which, for guidance of the state railroad commission in administering an
act regulating handling and use of liquefied petroleum, adopted the gas standards
previously prescribed by the National Board of Fire Underwriters. The statute author-
ized the commission to adopt changes made by the board, but did not require adoption.
The court said the prospective adoption problem was not then present, and it would
not decide that question.
100. In Board of Regents v. County of Lancaster, 154 Neb. 398, 402, 48 N.W,2d
221, 223 (1951), Smithberger is explained as involving an improper delegation to an
outside agency "by appropriating $4,000,000 without providing any rules or standards
for its expenditure." (Emphasis added.) Jones v. Kansas State Bd. of Medical Regik-
tration & Examination, 111 Kan. 813, 208 Pac. 639 (1922), held valid an adminis-
trative rule under which the medical examining board refused to examine graduates of
medical schools listed by the American Medical Association as "Class C.' A Class C
school was one which permitted state boards, but not the AMA, to inspect its operation.
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subsequent modifications was or would be improper. One of the
most frequently cited of these cases is Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Phoenix Title & Trust Co., 101 construing a state fire insurance
law requiring use of a policy form known as the "New York Stand-
ard" as it "now or may hereafter be constituted." However, the
counsel who sought to take advantage of the statutory requirement
"concedes, and we think correctly, that the portion of [the statute]
...adopting future changes ...is unconstitutional," 0 2 and he
contended that the assumed unconstitutional part could be severed
leaving a valid reference to existing material. The court agreed with
counsel, and its entire discussion of delegability is the language
quoted above. 103
The earliest decision construing a state law levying a tax based on
the net income on which tax was paid to the federal government
sustained the law, apparently even where applied to future changes
in federal law. In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain 101 the
court said:
The federal Income Tax Law is a domestic statute. No delegation of legis-
lative authority is involved in adopting its definition of net income. It is a
matter of convenience to taxpayers ant economy to the State not to set up
a separate standard and another administrative establishment for the
measurement of taxable net income.'05
Similar laws of other states were upheld, but only by interpreting
them as adopting the federal law then in force, in Santee Mills v.
Query o and Featherstone v. Norman.0 7 While Santee assumes that
reference to the law as amended would exceed the legislature's
power, relying only on one of the prohibition cases for this conclu-
sion, 08 it can be considered as primarily a statutory interpretation
case. It has been widely cited, however, on the delegation argument,
and Underwood Typewriter usually is not referred to.
101. 28 Ariz. 22,235Pac. 137 (1925).
102. 28 Ariz. at 27, 235 Fac. at 138.
103. The Arizona court, in Valley Nat'l Bank of Phoenix v. Clover, 62 Ariz. 538,
159 P.2d 292 (1945), upheld a state law providing that no veteran entitled to benefits
under the Federal Servicemen's Readjustment Act, or his spouse, should be under legal
disability because of minority to make contracts with reference to such benefits. The
court said this merely adopted federal law to determine who was entitled to the benefits
of the state law; the basic policy was that of the state law. A comparable case is People
v. Oyama, 29 Cal .2d 164, 173 P.2d 794 (1946), upholding the states alien land law
although it used as a primary standard eligibility to citizenship under federal laws. That
decision was reversed, but not because of the reference, in Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948).
104. 94 Conn. 47, 108 At. 154 (1919), aft'd, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
105. 94 Conn. at 65, 108 At. at 160-61.
106. 122 S.C. 158, 115 S.E. 202 (1922). See also Commonwealth v. Warner Bros.
Theatres Inc., 345 Pa. 270, 27 A.2d. 62 (1942).
107. 170 Ga. 370, 153 S.E. 58, (1930), followed in Head v. McKenney, 61 Ca.
App. 552, 6 S.E.2d 405 (1939) (despite its date, involving a 1930 tax return).
108. 122 S.C. 158, 168 115 S.E. 202, 205 (1922).
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Thereafter state attempts to incorporate federal tax law lan-
guished for some time, until Alaska in 1949 imposed a tax of ten
percent of the federal tax, and referred to the Internal Revenue
Code as amended or as hereafter amended.109 This law was attacked
as unlawful delegation, and a number of cases were cited to support
that contention, among them Ex parte Lasswell. The district court
agreed that according to the majority of cases the act was improper,
but considered Lasswell to hold otherwise and to be persuasive;
further, as there had been no applicable subsequent federal amend-
ments, it was unnecessary to consider the effect of future changes.""
The court of appeals also upheld the Alaska law, both as to incor-
poration of existing and of future federal law, relying in part on the
widespread state laws adopting the federal estate tax laws by ref-
erence to take advantage of the eighty percent credit, and to the
Conformity Act, to which Mr. Justice Holmes referred in his Knick-
erbocker dissent."'
Since 1950, and especially since 1954, a number of states have
utilized the technique of reference to the Internal Revenue Code,
either to define state taxable income, or to provide that the state tax
be a percentage of the federal. Nearly all have specifically referred
to the Code as it may be amended." 2 Kentucky incorporated only
the Code as then in existence,1 3 and the Iowa reference was at first
not clear although some supporters argued it referred only to exist-
ing law."' Only in New Hampshire have reported decisions relating
109. ALAsKA Comp. LAws ANN. § 48-10-1 to -14 (2 Cum. Supp. 1957).
110. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Mullaney, 84 F.Supp. 561 (D. Alaska 1949).
111. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Mullaney, 180 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1950).
112. E.g., MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 84-4905 (1947). See Kamins, Federally-Based
State Income Taxes, 9 NAT'L TAX J. 46 (1956); Note, 17 MONT. L. REv. 203 (1950).
According to Kamins, the Attorney General of Kansas and Pennsylvania have ruled that
such statutes are valid. In Brown v. State, 323 Mo. 138, 19 S.W.2d 12 (1929), a similar
reference to the Federal Estate Tax Act of 1926 was sustained, the court saying this
was not incorporation by reference but reference only for identification of the minimum
tax. Although much comment sometimes is made of the fact that there has been no
litigation regarding the reference in state estate tax laws to the federal estate tax, it
should be noted that no taxpayer could benefit by litigating the point - if the state
didn't get the money, the federal government would. Kamins also notes that in some
states, such as Vermont, the taxpayer is given an alternative of following tho federal
basis or computing under a detailed state tax; because of the difficulties in computing
separately, nearly all taxpayers probably will use the federal basis without investigating
what might otherwise be due; and this method may discourage litigation over the in
futuro reference.
113. Ky. REV. STAT. § 141.010 (1955) provided in part: "'Internal Revenue Code'
means the Internal Revenue Code in effect on January 1, 1954." The date has been
changed from 1954 to 1956. Ky. Laws 4th Extra Sess. 1956, ch. 4, § 19, at 233.
114. Iowa Laws 1955, ch. 208, at 236, referred to but did not define "Internal
Revenue Code of 1954." See Miller, The New Iowa Income Tax Law, 41 IowA L. R11v.
85 (1955). Mr. Miller is the principal author of the Iowa law. He indicated to me at one
time that he thought reference to the federal law as amended probably would be con-
stitutional. However, as many legislators were doubtful on this point, the law was
written without such reference; statements in legislative discussion were that future
changes were not incorporated, and Mr. Miller thereafter consistently has so stated. In
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to such laws appeared. There it has been held that the state law
may define state net income as net income under the federal code
then in effect, 15 but may not impose a tax of ten percent of the
federal tax because the state tax would then be a graduated rather
than a flat rate tax, the state having no authority to levy a graduated
tax." 6 There is no discussion of the propriety of a non-graduated
tax based on federal net income computed in accordance with sub-
sequent changes in federal law.
The latest state court pronouncement comes in the field of profes-
sional licensing. Several California decisions have permitted its state
medical examining board to recognize diplomas from schools meet-
ing standards of the Association of American Medical Colleges in
the year of their graduation, even though graduation might occur
(and new standards be applicable) after the statute creating the
board was enacted."-7 In 1957 the Washington court held a some-
what similar statute invalid,"' relying on State v. Crawford, and
also saying: "Statutes adopting existing Federal rules, regulations
or statutes are valid but attempts to adopt future Federal rules,
regulations or statutes are unconstitutional and void." 11 For the
quoted proposition the court cited various decisions, in some of
which the point was but dictum, and also cited Ex parte Lasswell.
No reference was made to cases opposed to the proposition. The
Alaskan income tax cases were ignored, and the court apparently
failed to recognize that Lasswell actually is contra to its position.""0
1957 the Iowa legislature did take action to adopt all federal changes made to that time
since the 1955 law became effective. Iowa Laws 1957, ch. 209, § 1, at 268. I argued
that in view of the failure to follow the Kentucky method, and the uncertainty whether
"Internal Revenue Code of 1954" referred only to the law as initially enacted, that the
original Iowa law could be interpreted to incorporate subsequent federal changes, al-
though I recognized that the court would not necessarily make such an interpretation.
See Hayes ,The New Iowa Income Tax Regulations, 5 DaXEM L. REv. 15, 16 (1955).
This point was made more directly in a speech at the Tax School of the Iowa State Bar
Association, in December, 1955. The 1957 legislation makes clear the legislative intent
that federal modifications after 1956 are not adopted unless and until the Iowa legisla-
ture chooses to do so.
115. Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. 540, 542, 64 A.2d 322, 323 (1949).
116. Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 525, 526-27, 113 A.2d 547, 547-48 (1955).
117. Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 77 Pac. 166 (1904), followed in Arwine v. Board
of Medical Examiners, 151 Cal. 499, 91 Pac. 319 (1907).
118. State v. Urquhart, 50 Wash. 2d 131, 310 P.2d 261 (1957).
119. 50 Wash. 2d at 137,310 P.2d at 265.
120. As I have not had access to the briefs and arguments of counsel, I do not know
to what extent the opposing arguments were called to the courts attention. The result
of the case is one which to many may seem eminently just. Plaintiff was a refugee, a
graduate of a foreign medical school, who with her husband (also a doctor) had come
to the states. Under the law in force when they arrived in Washingon, both qualified
for admission to practice. He was admitted but she delayed appication for several
years while staying home to raise their child. By the time she applied for admission
the law had been so changed that she would qualify only if the foreign school from
which she was graduated was on a list of the Medical Association as approved for the
year of her graduation. No list of any school, of the type called for, had been made by
the Association.
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Some delegation of legislative power is permitted by nearly all
state courts today. In the closely related problem of delegation of
authority to administrative bodies there has been a marked tend-
ency to uphold delegating legislation.121 Some decisions which have
stated that a reference to a statute is unconstitutional, if (or to
the extent that) subsequent modifications are included, do not
indicate that much independent thought was given to the issue.
The statement is dictum in some cases, and where so has usually
been assumed to be true by court and counsel without argument.
Supporting citations include other cases in which the matter was
dictum. Rarely are cases permitting such references mentioned by a
court invalidating them.2 2
While the Sharpnack decision has no direct bearing on the ques-
tion whether in futuro incorporation affronts state constitutional
restrictions on legislative power to delegate, it must be treated as
overruling dictum in several federal decisions cited by some state
courts as bearing on the question by analogy. Sharpnack may induce
courts hereafter faced with the issue to make a more careful analysis
of the problem, and it may lead more courts to say that such incor-
poration is a matter of legislative policy within the judgment of the
legislature. Shortly before Sharpnack was decided, the New Jersey
court reached that conclusion in a carefully reasoned opinion which
may also have considerable impact on other state courts. Upholding
a state net weight law which required the state superintendent to
fix standards in accordance with standards previously or subse-
quently fixed by federal authorities, the court in State v. Hotel Bar
Foods Inc. said:
Although the early decisions generally spoke in prohibitory terms, it is
now established that legislative delegations are permissible so long as the,
are accompanied by sufficient basic standards. . . . Realistically viewed,
the distinction [between cases where the state agency was authorized to
adopt federal regulations and those where it was required to do so] seems
insubstantial and hardly sufficient to determine basic issues of constitu-
tionality. The ultimate and controlling policy decision - as to whether
there shall be uniformity of federal-state regulation in the field - rests
always with the Legislature and it does not in any vicious sense abdicate
its legislative judgment or authority. [Clearly existing law can be adopted;
unless prospective law may also be adopted] the State's policy of uni-
formity would, as a practical matter, soon be defeated.12 3
121. DAvis, ADMINISThATIVE LAW 86 (1951).
122. gee, e.g., Florida Industrial Comm'n v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 152 Fla. 55,
10 So. 2d 793 (1943) (referring to incorporation of regulations, and their interpreta-
tions, of a federal administrative agency after the state law became effective). In Note,
70 HAv. L. REv. 685, 688 n.33, it is pointed out that many courts holding in futuro
referential legislation invalid adopt their position without discussion.
123. 18 N.J. 115, 124-25, 112 A.2d 726, 731-32 (1955).
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Any court analyzing the problem presented by in futuro incor-
poration should give consideration to two objections thereto on
which the nondelegability argument seems to be based. Prior eases
often have not stated these objections with clarity. The first is the
feeling, which Mr. Justice Douglas expresses in Sharpnack, that the
law referred to may not fit the policy of the incorporating legislature
if changed and the person subjected to it because of incorporation
would not then have had the considered judgment of the legislature
on the matter. Horack, who has taken the position that adoption
which includes prospective legislation is constitutional, attempts to
meet this objection by arguing that the incorporating legislature has
retained power to change the statute if unsatisfactory changes are
made in the law referred to; he also feels that any temporary disad-
vantages are outweighed by the advantages gained by uniformity. 4
The other objection seems to be a feeling that laws should be
made by elected representatives of the people, responsible to the
electorate for their actions, and certainly should not be made by out-
siders deliberately setting out to change the law. This attitude is
especially significant where authority is delegated to administrative
bodies or to private groups having a special interest in the subject
matter involved. Horacek's answer to the first objection has some
relevance here as well. In addition, should the objection be of sub-
stantial significance where subsequent changes result because of
actions by other legislative bodies primarily concerned with their
own law?
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts concerned with state references to prospective legislation
of Congress, or of other states, must now evaluate those references
in the light of Sharpnack, and also of Hotel Bar Foods. The effect of
those cases may well be to decrease reliance on implied constitu-
tional objections to delegation of legislative power. As in the cases
involving delegation to administrative agencies, more attention will
be directed toward the standards provided by the referring legisla-
ture. And the "due process" limitations, relating to clarity and
definiteness, should increase in importance. Some courts may be
reluctant to uphold references by a state to material of a private
organization, or to statutes of another state (apart, perhaps, from
reciprocal type legislation), but references by a state to federal
legislation may generally meet with readier acceptance.
Referential legislation, its consequences carefully analyzed by the
legislature before adoption, prepared by careful draftsmen, can
serve a useful purpose in limited but sometimes highly important
124. 1 SurHELAN, STATUTES AND STA.TUTORY CoS'ucrio, § 310 (3d ed. 19-13).
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situations. In many of these situations, its usefulness is substantially
increased if the reference includes prospective as well as existing
legislation. But "unwisely handled, it leads to endless confusion and
ambiguity,"125 and where its undesirable effects are apparent this
may encourage a reviewing court to search for constitutional
grounds on which to strike down what appears to be unwise, or ill-
considered legislation.
125. Poldervaart, Legislation By Reference-A Statutonj Jungle, 38 IowA L. RLv,.
705, 737 (1953).
